

TOP SECRET

2 December 1974

25X1

Copy 15 of 22

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for the Intelligence Community

SUBJECT : Review of SIGINT Committee Functions and
Organization

1. CIA requested a review of the SIGINT Committee functions, based on a concern that the range of disciplines and user interests has become too broad and complex to be handled adequately in the existing SIGINT Committee structure. This Review Group considered a variety of proposals for the future organization and work of the SIGINT Committee. Suggestions ranged from the idea of abolishing the Committee altogether to recommendations that a whole new complex of SIGINT Working Groups be established, oriented to individual SIGINT disciplines [redacted]

The attention of the Review Group was focused primarily on (a) ways of improving SIGINT guidance, requirements, evaluation and assessment in the context of the total U.S. intelligence effort, and (b) other areas of concern for the SIGINT Committee.

25X1

2. The Group has concluded that there is a need for a SIGINT Committee and that its operations can and should be made more effective. The Review Group agrees that the SIGINT Committee should be equipped to do a more thorough job in all phases of SIGINT; at the same time the Group is concerned that greater concentration on particular disciplines not subvert the Committee's ability to arrive at a proper balance among disciplines and to deal effectively with cross-discipline priorities problems.

3. Having in mind the DCI's Letter of Instruction to the Chairman of the SIGINT Committee, following are the areas in which we believe the greatest improvement is needed:

- intelligence guidance for SIGINT programs,

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/08/19 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000100140007-6

- requirements,
- evaluations and assessments, and
- judgments on SIGINT resources.

a. Intelligence Guidance: Except in the SIGINT satellite field, the intelligence community has not maintained an effective long-term intelligence guidance
To remedy this situation, the revised SIGINT Committee should prepare SIGINT guidance responsive to changing needs and capabilities.

25X1

b. Requirements: The SIGINT Committee requirements responsibilities will be concentrated on requirements which should be continued, modified or eliminated. In this connection, an important area will be the focus on collection processing and report requirements which have an impact on resource allocations. The SIGINT Committee should consider proposed changes to on-going SIGINT efforts against estimates of the impact such changes would have. The SIGINT Committee will look to NSA to advise of all requirements not specifically validated by the USIB or the SIGINT Committee. Requests for information readily available in NSA and having no impact on resources should continue to be serviced by NSA without the need to involve the committee.

For those matters referred to the Committee, the principal requirement responsibilities would be to:

- 1) recommend adjustments and priority changes concerning collection, processing and reporting; and
- 2) monitor the impact on SIGINT programs of information needs levied by departments, agencies, Commands and NIO's.

c. Assessments: We recognize that community assessments require the greatest improvement. The fundamental reasons for existing deficiencies in assessments are the lack of commitment by the community to the evaluation process and the inherent difficulty of conducting assessments without an on-going system for product evaluation. SIGINT assessments relating to the

25X1

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

25X1 process of Key Intelligence Questions--the KIQ-KEP evaluation cycle--will answer part of this need. However, value judgments [redacted] will be only partial inputs to the KIQ-KEP Evaluation Process. Assessments generally require "building blocks" from an on-going evaluation system. The SIGINT Committee should implement and monitor an agreed procedure for evaluation of SIGINT product. With improved evaluations and assessments, the SIGINT Committee could provide more sharply focused judgments on intelligence guidance priorities and on the impact of changes in SIGINT resources.

d. Intelligence Judgments on SIGINT Resources:

Problems requiring community judgments on SIGINT resources occur in many forms and forums. In most of these, the DCI needs staff support and coordination of recommendations among department and agency directors most concerned.

Recommendations are coordinated through IRAC, USIB, the Director's Intelligence Community Staff or his National Intelligence Officers. The SIGINT Committee should provide the community staff work for the development of SIGINT recommendations. Under this function, the principal activities of the SIGINT Committee could be the development of intelligence judgments on:

- 1) the impact of program proposals on existing requirements, and
- 2) the mix or complement of resources required for collection and exploitation in the future.

4. It is clear that the SIGINT Committee, as presently staffed, would be hard pressed to accomplish all the foregoing. The Review Group believes that a small staff of experts should be established to serve the Chairman of the SIGINT Committee and the Committee as a whole:

a. The staff would consist of SIGINT officers having experience in technical sources [redacted] knowledge of their value in meeting intelligence requirements.

b. Responsibilities of the officers, subject to SIGINT Committee agreement, could include:

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

1) Drafting papers for SIGINT Committee consideration.

2) Assisting in:

(a) Drafting intelligence guidance for programming.

(b) Drafting intelligence assessments of responsiveness.

(c) Analyzing the intelligence impact of proposals for changes in SIGINT reporting or levels of effort.

(d) Evaluating the intelligence gains and losses involved in collection options.

(e) Timely definition of major SIGINT gaps, with particular emphasis on gaps relating to Key Intelligence Questions, and preparing recommendations on courses of corrective action.

(f) System and product evaluation.

3) Coordinating actions on near-term requirements.

4) Monitoring the impact of individual agency requirements on SIGINT efforts.

c. The Staff would be assigned to duties with the full-time offices of the Chairman's Secretariat at the CIA Headquarters Building.

5. We are mindful that the original CIA request to examine a restructure of the SIGINT Committee was based on a concern that the range of disciplines and user interests has become too broad and complex to be handled adequately in the existing SIGINT Committee structure. As part of the CIA request, it was suggested that the concept of Working Groups (or subcommittees) for the major SIGINT disciplines be considered as the most direct means of making perceived and needed improvements. Alternatively, the Group examined a

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/08/19 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000100140007-6

restructure based on major functions (requirements, evaluation, etc.) in lieu of disciplines. It was concluded that a revised Committee structure based on either discipline or function would present an unwieldy mechanism not likely to be responsive to the problems at hand.

6. The new DCI Letter of Instruction to the SIGINT Committee Chairman (then in draft) bore heavily on our considerations. This letter was endorsed by the Group for early issuance, and the subsequent recommendations for the Group for an augmented staff were aimed at effective implementation of the letter.

7. It is not clear the extent to which the establishment of a SIGINT Committee Staff will eventually obviate the need for part or all of the present subcommittee structure. It would seem desirable to retain at [redacted] until it can be determined what functions can be assumed by the main committee and its staff.

8. A reconstituted SIGINT Committee will require the assistance of other Community mechanisms and the consumers of intelligence if its work on guidance, requirements, evaluation and assessment is to be objective, consonant with overall intelligence needs, and based on all-source considerations. We are particularly conscious of the need for an improved Community-level mechanism for determining the requirements which should be levied on SIGINT and those which should be primarily applied to other sources. We are also concerned over the need for continuous evaluation of SIGINT products by consumers in the individual departments and agencies, so that efforts are better focused on more important and productive targets.

9. Conclusions: Better staff arrangements are needed for the formulation of intelligence community judgments on SIGINT programs and activities. In order to improve all major SIGINT Committee functions--guidance, requirements, evaluations, and assessments--greater attention should be given to the distinctive features of individual SIGINT disciplines as well as to cross-discipline problems. The SIGINT Committee should be staffed to deal more knowledgeably and effectively with the relationships between (a) the special technical capabilities of various SIGINT sources and (b) the contributions which these sources make to producers and consumers of intelligence. The additional staff personnel would be responsible for researching problem areas on the various disciplines; developing papers and studies as directed by the Chairman; and coordinating matters pertaining to SIGINT Committee among the various agencies and activities concerned.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/08/19 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000100140007-6

10. Recommendations: It is recommended that you request the Director of Central Intelligence to:

a. Authorize the Chairman of the SIGINT Committee to establish, with the advice and approval of the Committee, a small staff of SIGINT officers to be assigned to duty to serve the Chairman and the Committee in fulfilling their responsibilities.

b. Approve the attached DCID on the SIGINT Committee.

SIGNED



25X1

25X1

6

TOP SECRET


Approved For Release 2004/08/19 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000100140007-6

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/08/19 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000100140007-6
Distribution:

Cy # 1 - General Wilson

- # 2 -
- # 3 -
- # 4 -
- # 5 -
- # 6 -
- # 7 -
- # 8 -
- # 9 -
- #10 -
- #11 -
- #12 -
- #13 -
- #14 -
- #15 -
- #16 -
- #17 -
- #18 -
- #19 -
- #20 -
- #21 -
- #22 -



25X1

to Registry ✓

MPRRD

25X1

IC/MPRRD/E [redacted] (2 December 1974)

25X1



TOP SECRET

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt